ABSTRACT Effective cryptocurrency key management has become an urgent requirement for modern cryptocurrency. Although a large body of cryptocurrency wallet-management schemes has been proposed, they are mostly constructed for specific application scenarios and often suffer from weak security. In this paper, we propose a more effective, usable, and secure cryptocurrency wallet-management system based on semi-trusted social networks, therein allowing users to collaborate with involved parties to achieve some powerful functions and recovery under certain circumstances. Furthermore, we employ an identity-based hierarchical key-insulated encryption scheme to achieve time-sharing authorization and present a semitrusted portable social-network-based wallet-management scheme that provides the features of securityenhanced storage, portable login on different devices, no-password authentication, flexible key delegation, and so on. The performance analysis shows that our proposed schemes require minimal additional overhead and have low time delays, making them sufficiently efficient for real-world deployment.
I. INTRODUCTION
As of November 30, 2017, the value of a bitcoin had gone past $10,000, and the total value of all bitcoins has now surpassed $177 billion. There is no doubt that bitcoin is becoming the most successful cryptocurrency [1] . Bitcoin, proposed by Nakamoto [2] , represents a new concept of decentralized currency, in which security is guaranteed by cryptography and consensus mechanisms. For example, the unforgeability of transactions is protected by public-key cryptography. However, modern public-key cryptography is not easy to use by the public because the private key is too long and complex to be managed. Some researchers [3] - [5] have shown that public-key cryptography cannot be deployed for practical usage for numerous reasons, especially for complicated key management.
Furthermore, each bitcoin is associated with a pair of keys, and if someone wants to deal with transactions on different devices, they have to keep the copies of the private keys for each bitcoin address on each device. Compared with traditional centralized economic systems, the pseudonym mechanism cuts off the relationship between actual identities and ownership of bitcoin, and the blockchain technology leads to irreversible transactions. When the private keys become poorly managed, the bitcoin might be stolen or lost forever [6] , [7] . As the report in [8] mentioned, by the end of November 2017, bitcoins valuing more than $31 million have been stolen.
Thus, managing cryptocurrency keys effectively and securely is one of the biggest security challenges restricting the widespread usage of modern cryptocurrency. Recently, some enthusiastic cryptocurrency developers have proposed a variety of technologies such as password-derived keys [9] , physical storage, secret-key QR codes, password-protect wallets, air-gapped storage, and online wallets. However, these proposed schemes also have various disadvantages. Password-derived key management relies on the security of the password, which is problematic when the password is too weak and easily guessed or is reusable when stolen. Although the physical storage methods fill the gap presented by human memory, they face numerous threats, e.g., they are not secure against theft. Moreover, the security of online wallets relies on the assumption that the centralized online server is trusted, which is an idealization in realistic scenarios. Passwordprotected wallets adopt the idea of traditional U-key models used in online banking; if passwords are forgotten, the user loses all of their bitcoins in their wallet.
Overall, although bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have attracted significant attention and influenced the whole world, there has not been a secure and efficient key management mechanism to faultlessly bridge the gap between the limited memory of humans and the complex key structures of cryptocurrencies. Therefore, proposing an effective and secure cryptocurrency wallet management system currently is the key aspect in making cryptocurrency more applicable to daily payments by individuals.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we propose a more effective, usable, and secure cryptocurrency wallet management system based on semi-trusted social networks. In this system, a useraŕs wallet cannot be recovered by anyone but the user, and the user can collaborate with some involved parties to perform some powerful functions. Our main contributions are as follows:
We propose a semi-trusted portable social-network-based wallet management scheme, which provides the benefits of security-enhanced storage, portable login on different devices, no-password authentication, flexible key delegation, blind wallet recovery, etc. The proposed scheme is also proved to be secure.
We incorporate a key management evaluation framework to evaluate various aspects of our scheme. We conduct comprehensive comparisons among popular cryptocurrency key management schemes following the evaluation framework. The comparisons confirm the advantages of our scheme over other solutions.
Finally, we give a performance analysis of our proposed schemes, and the results show that using such securityenhanced and full-function wallet requires minimal overhead and that the time delay is only a couple of milliseconds, which is sufficiently efficient for real-world utilization. The proposed wallet management mechanism provides a new vision for innovation in making public-key cryptography deployment practical, thereby moving cryptocurrency closer to practical application.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review related work in Section 2. We formalize the model of our key management scheme and the system security model in Section 3. We introduce some underlying cryptographic algorithms in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our proposed social-network-based cryptocurrency wallet management scheme. We demonstrate the system's security in Section 6 and evaluate the performance of our protocols in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
To make cryptocurrency convenient to use, energetic cryptocurrency community developers have invested significant amounts of time and energy in implementing numerous automatic wallet management tools. In this section, we will classify these tools by deployment issues introduced by Eskandari et al. [10] and introduce basic design principles and potential risks.
A. KEY STORAGE IN LOCAL STORAGE
Storing keys in local storage is an obvious solution. Typically, the keys are stored in a file system or a pre-assigned directory. When a cryptocurrency client wants to extract the key to execute a transaction, the local storage server can read the pre-configure file system to obtain the key files. Once the client creates a new key pair, it can also update the key files. Although this method is easy to implement, any malware can also read and write the key files without access control. Litke and Stewart [11] found that the primary targets of specialized cryptocurrency-stealing malware are wallets. If malware can tamper with key files, wallet hijacking becomes possible, therein silently stealing miners' earnings.
B. PASSWORD-PROTECTED WALLET
To guarantee the confidentiality of key files, the MultiBit Team proposed a password-protected wallet [12] . The password-protected wallet can prevent physical theft, and the security of this system is based on the strength of the password. Although this method can recover the wallets when the user keeps the corresponding password, no effective mechanism can be used to bypass the encryption system once someone forgets the password. The owner must brute force the system by guessing a strong password.
C. OFFLINE STORAGE WALLET
When a wallet is stored on portable media, enhanced security against malware and storage theft can be achieved. However, offline storage wallets have a very conspicuous disadvantage. Compared with software wallets, wallets stored offline take more time to spend funds because the offline storage device is not always readily available. A very interesting case of this wallet is the paper wallet, which is always in the form of a QR code printed on paper. However, offline storage wallets have the drawback in that they are easily lost. Once the USB device becomes missing or the paper with the QR code is blown away, the owner may lose the corresponding wallet forever. Furthermore, the media must be regenerated or updated when the key pool changes.
D. PASSWORD-DERIVED WALLET
In the BIP32 protocol [13] , the bitcoin core development group proposed a key generation algorithm called hierarchical deterministic wallets. This type of wallet contains a master key, decided by a single user, for delegating other derived secret keys. The advantage is obvious. With this wallet, the users only need to remember a chosen memorable secret such as their favorite food, birthday, or best friends. However, once a derived key is revealed, according to the public algorithms, any malicious actor can obtain the subkey derived from the derived key. A very popular case of this wallet is called brain wallet. However, Vasek et al. [14] recently analyzed the security of the brain wallet. The analysis results show that more than 800 brain wallets were using weak passwords and were worth more than $ 100K.
E. HOSTED WALLETS
A final method of key management is to host the users' keys on a web service. The host service provider provides the servers to store the users accounts and assist users in key management and transactions. The users on these platforms can use the cryptocurrency system even when they have little knowledge about cryptocurrency. However, the hosted wallets are based on a very strong security assumption that the third-party service provider is trusted. However, accidents whereby hosted wallets are stolen by hackers or are lost by the host service provider closing down occur frequently. The statistical data show that there have been over 40 events involving losses of greater than 1000 bitcoin [15] .
III. MODEL AND DEFINITION
In this subsection, we give an overview of our socialnetwork-based cryptocurrency wallet management scheme. First, we introduce some important components of our proposed scheme. Then, we give some formalized definitions. The system architecture is depicted in Figure 1 .
A. SYSTEM MODEL
• User. A user, denoted as U in our system, is the owner of the cryptocurrency wallets. Generally, a cryptocurrency wallet is a key pool that consists of a variety of long disordered strings; it is difficult for U to remember all of these keys by his memory. Therefore, U always needs a more efficient method to memorize this sensitive information. In our system, U only needs to link his identity to a special device called the ''Management device'', which acts as a representative to help U generate and record his wallet.
• Management device. The management device, denoted as M, acts as a plenipotentiary for managing U's wallets. M initializes and stores U's wallet with some extra information generated by a remote server. When U wants to check the wallet on a proxy device, M checks the validity of the proxy and gives it the authority to decrypt the pre-encrypted wallet data stored on a remote sever.
• Proxy. The proxy, denoted as P, can be installed on any smart electronic device, e.g., a computer, iPad, and smart phone, on which any U wants to obtain his wallet to perform a transaction. When receiving the request from some U, P recognizes the type of wallet and both retrieves and fills the corresponding accounts.
• Central Server. The central server, denoted as C, acts as both centralized data storage and an information transfer and processing platform. U registers Us and their representative and provides functions such as identity authentication, wallet generation assistance, wallet back-up assistance, wallet restore assistance, and message forwarding. We assume that the servers are honest but curious, which means that C will execute the protocol by default but also wants to extract some information from the stored data.
1) SYSTEM SETUP
The three parties generate necessary parameters, authenticate each other's identity and establish a secure communication channel among them.
2) REGISTER PHASE
The registers a new M account to the central server and generates available login token.
3) MASTER KEY BACKUP
The user splits the master password into shares to the central server and other users (friends) without letting the latter know any information about the exact shares.
4) AUTHENTICATED
The user submits the request to the server through a proxy, and the master device authenticates the user's identity and allows the legitimate proxy to obtain the related wallet.
However, without being authorized, any other user cannot obtain any wallet information via the proxy.
5) WALLET RECOVERY
When the user loses the master device or needs to update the master device, he/her recovers the master key using the central server and other users. However, throughout the process, neither the server nor the assisting users can know any information about the master password.
B. SECURITY MODEL
Before giving the detailed security model, we must emphasize two aspects. First, we assume that the running environment is secure, which means that the program code is not tampered with and that there are no keyboard or memory loggers recording any wallet account information. Moreover, we also assume that all the underlying algorithms are implemented correctly and that all the parameters meet the security requirements.
In our system, the main security goal is to ensure the confidentiality of the wallet accounts. Considering the semitrusted server, the adversary can have access to the server's wallet database, but it can only read certain database items. In addition, once M is obtained by an attacker, the attacker can obtain access to M and can read or write the encrypted database of M. This assumption holds, for example, when someone is the best friend or a relative of Mąŕs owner; it is easy for them to have access to M when emergencies occur.
To define the adversary ability, we first introduce the definition of the wallet management database, which utilizes the definition of the password management database proposed by Gasti and Rasmussen [16] . Although this definition is used to analyze the security of password management databases, it is also suitable for our scheme because in a sense the cryptocurrency wallet accounts can also be seen as a variant of a password. The wallet management database can be defined by 3 probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, Setup, Create, and Open, as follows.
Definition 1 (Wallet Management Database):
The wallet management database can be defined by 3 probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, Setup, Create, and Open as follows.
mk ← Setup(I , λ): Given a security parameter λ, the algorithm outputs a key pair mk corresponding to the identity I .
DB ← Create(mk, RC): Given a system key pair mk and a set of records RC = {record 1 , record 2 , . . . , record n }, the algorithm outputs a database DB, where DB = {db i } n i=1 . RC ← Open(mk, DB): Given a system key pair mk and a database DB, the algorithm outputs a database RC.
Then, we defined the adversary model as follows: (pp, mk) ← PGen(λ, ): The PGen algorithm, a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, is used to initialize the system parameters. The algorithm takes the system security parameter λ and the depth of system as input, and then, it initializes the system's public parameter pp and master key mk.
(dk I ,0 , hk
The KGen algorithm, also a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, takes the system master key mk and the user's identity I ∈ I as input; then, it outputs the initial decryption key dk I ,0 and the helper keys hk ( i) I ,0 for the ith level device, where i ∈ {1, . . . , }. . We remark that there is a time period map function T i (time) introduced by Watanable and Shikata [17] , in which a long time period is separated into shorter periods. We set (PK , SK ) ← KeyGen(λ). A probabilistic key generation algorithm that, given a security parameter λ, outputs the key pair (PK , SK ).
σ ← Sign(SK , m). A probabilistic signature algorithm that takes the secret key SK and the message m as input and then outputs the signature σ .
1 or ⊥ ← Verify(PK , λ). A probabilistic verification algorithm that takes the public key PK and the signatureλ as input and then outputs 1 if the signature is valid or outputs ⊥.
Definition 5 (Secret Sharing): A secret sharing scheme allows one to divide a secret inton shares; if any t or more shares are combined, they can reconstruct the origin secret with their shares. The first secret sharing scheme was proposed by Shamir [18] as follows: To divide the secret a 0 into pieces, pick a random t-1-degree polynomial q(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + . . . + a t−1 x t+1 ; let q(i) be the ith share. Given any subset of t and these q(i) values, the coefficients of q(x) can be recovered by Lagrange interpolation. Finally, let x = 0, and the value q(0) = a 0 is the reconstructed secret. We defined the Shamir secret sharing scheme SS = (f (n, t), R),, where f (n, t) denotes the splitting algorithm of the secret sharing scheme and R is the secret reconstruction algorithm.
Definition 6 (Digital Signature Scheme): A digital signature scheme consists of the polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, Sign, Verify), denoted as (K, S, V).
(PK , SK ) ← KeyGen(λ). A probabilistic key generation algorithm that, given a security parameter λ, outputs the key pair (PK , SK ).
σ ← Sign(SK , m). A probabilistic signature algorithm takes the secret key SK and the message m as input and outputs the signature σ . 1 or ⊥ ← Verify(PK , λ). A probabilistic verification algorithm that takes the public key PK and the signatureλ as input and either outputs 1 if the signature is valid or outputs ⊥.
Definition 7 (Secret Sharing):
A secret sharing scheme allows one to divide a secret into n shares whereby if any t or more shares are combined, they can reconstruct the origin secret with their shares. The first secret sharing scheme was proposed by Shamir [18] as follows: To divide the secret a 0 into pieces, pick a random t-1-degree polynomial q(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + . . . + a t−1 x t+1 ; let q(i) be the ith share. Given any subset of t of these q(i) values, the coefficients of q(x) can be recovered by Lagrange interpolation. Finally, let x = 0, and the value q(0) = a 0 is the reconstructed secret. We define the Shamir secret sharing scheme SS = (f (n, t), R), where f (n, t) denotes the splitting algorithm of the secret sharing scheme and R is the secret reconstruction algorithm.
V. SOCIAL-NETWORK-BASED CRYPTOCURRENCY WALLET MANAGEMENT SCHEME
We propose a portable semi-trusted social-network-based cryptocurrency wallet management scheme. The utilized cryptographic building blocks include a Shamir secret sharing scheme SS = (f (n, t), R), a digital signature scheme sig = (K, S, V), an identity key-insulated encryption IKE = (PGen, KGen, UpGen, DkUp, Enc, Dec), and symmetric encryption (E, D).
Protocol 1 (System Setup): When the system is set up, it initializes several system parameters. The S first generates an RSA key pair (e, N , d) , where e, N is the public key and d is the private key. Then, it chooses a symmetric encryption (E, D) and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ and generate the parameters for SS and Sig with the security parameter λ. To establish a secure channel and authentication between each other, the system generates he initial certificates for M, C and P.
Protocol 2 (Registration Phase): When a U wants to be a new user of the system. He/she should first bind their identity with an M and generate a valid login credential on M; then, they should submit registration information to C: 1) U registers a system account, and M generates the necessary parameters and secure channel to C. The authentication between U and M can use the popular bio authentication method.
• U first chooses a system account ID U and then generates his/her personal authentication information Per. Let A = (per, ID U ).
• M chooses a random number r, computes A = r e H (A) mod N , and submits (ID U , A ) to C.
• After C receives the message from M, it computes A = A d mod N , and then, it returnsĀ and a challenge to M
• After receiving the response message, M computesÂ =Ār −1 mod N and checks whetherÂ e = A mod N . If so, M generates a secret key SK M = H (A Â ) and then computes the related public key PK M using K(λ).
• Then, M detects its individual device code and running environment, and then, it obtains distinguishable information Dinfo. Next, it computes its SK D = H (SK M Dinfo) and corresponding public key PK D using K(λ).
• M establishes (H (challenge PK M PK D ID U ),ID U ,PK M ,PK D ) as registration message and generates σ 0 = S(reg, SK cert M ); then, it sends (reg, σ 0 ) to C.
• C runs V(PK cert M , σ 0 ) to check whether the signature is valid. If so, it records the message reg in its registration database. 2) M initializes local wallet management. M randomly chooses a long-bit string mp as a delegated key seed.
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3) M creates a local wallet database and inserts the cryptocurrency wallet record RS i for currency (type j , count k ): • M calls IKE to generate the record's encryption key and encrypts the record as C (i) ← Enc(I , time, w i ). We should note that in our system, the HIKE system is reduced to a 2-level HIKE, which means that M only needs to update the decryption key for P.
• M then generates a unique tag i and a hash value of this record as MAC i = H (tag i C (i) row i ). Finally, the record RS i is submitted to C and stored in the form of
Protocol 3 (Master Key Backup):
The masker key is backed up as follows.
1) M divides mp into several parts and then calls the SS algorithm to perform the secret sharing with friends in a social network.
• M randomly selects 2 random numbers s 0 , s 1 such that mp = s 0 s 1 .
• M chooses a set of friend identities {ID 0 , ID 1 , . . . , ID n } and then computes s 1,i = f (ID i , s 1 ) for i = 1, . . . , n. 2) M processes and delivers the shared secret.
• U submits his/her personal authentication information Pinfo to M.
• M chooses a random numberr and computes Pinfo =r e H (Pinfo) mod N ; then, M submits (Pinfo ) to C.
• After C receives the message, it computesPinfo = (Pinfo ) d mod N and then returnsPinfo to M.
• After receiving the above messages, M computesPinfo =Pinfor −1 mod N and checks whetherPinfo e = Pinfo mod N . If so, it encrypts S 0 = E(s 0 ,Pinfo), S 1,i = E(s 1,i ,Pinfo), where i = 1, . . . , n.
• Finally, M sends S 0 to C and sends S 1,i to ID i , where i = 1, . . . , n. Protocol 4 (Authenticated): When a user decides to perform a transaction in an untrusted environment through a proxy software and obtain an assigned wallet account, he/she has to do as follows: 1) U launches P and initializes the communication parameters.
• According to the system parameters, P chooses a random number a ∈ Z * p and computes Q = aP, where P is the generator of an elliptic curve used in sig . Then, P runs S({Q a , τ 0 }, SK cert P ) to generate the signature σ 1 of the random number Q and timestamp τ 0 .
• Finally, P transmits the (Q, τ 0 , σ 1 ) to U and transforms (Q a , τ 0 , σ 1 ) into a QR code on the device screen.
2) U authenticates his/her identity to M. M proves to C that it has received the request from P.
• U should authenticate his identity to M by bio authentication (e.g., fingerprints). Then, U can use M to scan the QR code provided by P, which means that U needs some wallet information on P.
• Next, M can obtain (Q a , τ 0 , σ 1 ) from the QR code. Then, it will run V(σ 1 , PK cert P ) to check the validity of this signature. If it is valid, M chooses a random number b ∈ Z * p and computes Q b = bP.
3) Using C, P and M establish a secure communication channel.
• C first runs V to verify the validity of both σ 1 and σ 2 . If they are valid, C considers that M allows P to query M's wallet data stored in its database.
• Then, C forwards (Q b , τ 1 , σ 2 ) to P.
• After verifying σ 2 , P and M can negotiate a session key TK by computing TK = aQ b = bQ a = abP. 4) P obtains the assigned cryptocurrency address and private key from record RS i .
• M takes the current time and his own IKE helper key as input, runs the UpGen(·) algorithm, and obtains the HIKE decryption key update information δ
, TK ) and then transmits it to P over the secure channel.
• After receiving the messages, P runs DkUp(hk 0
) to update its decryption key.
• Finally, P queries the record database of C with the record tag tag i , and then, it uses Dec(dk I ,T 0 , C, time) to obtain the related wallet record.
Protocol 5 (Wallet Recovery):
When a U loses or changes his/her M, our system can support him/her in recovering their wallet without any extra information. 1) U initializes a new M and authenticates him or herself to S. VOLUME 6, 2018
• M chooses a random number r and computes A = r e H (A) mod N ; then, M submits (ID U , A ) to C.
• When C receives the message from M, it computes A = A d mod N ; then, it returnsĀ and a challenge to M.
• After receiving the response message, M computesÂ =Ār −1 mod N and checks whether A e = A mod N . If so, M generates a secret key SK M = H (A Â ) and then computes the related public key PK M using K(λ).
• For a real-time τ 3 , M generates the signature σ 3 = S(τ 3 , SK M ) and then submits (τ, σ 3 ) to S.
• S executes V(σ 3 , τ 3 , PK M ), where the PK M generated by U in the Registration Phase is stored by C. If it outputs 1, the C remarks this U and related M.
• Then, M detects its individual device code and running environment and obtains distinguishing information Dinfo ; then, it computes its SK D = H (SK M Dinfo ) and corresponding public key PK D ← K(λ). Next, M submits PK D to S. -S replaces the device public key with PK D and updates the master device information associated with U. 2) M submits its bound secret information to trigger the wallet recovery mechanism with C.
• Next, M chooses a random numberr and computes Pinfo =r e H (Pinfo). mod N . Then, M submits (Pinfo ) to C.
• After receiving the above message, M computeŝ Pinfo = (Pinfo)r −1 mod N and checks whether Pinfo e = Pinfo mod N . 3) M collects the shared secret from other social network participants.
• S asks the other social network participants with ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n to return the shared secret deposited by them.
• M should receive at least t + 1 secret sharing parts from different participants and S 0 from C. The received part is denoted as S 1,i , S 1,i+1 , . . . , S 1,i+t .
• 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Theorem 1:
Assuming that an encryption algorithm is an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme and that the hash function H is a collision-resistant hash function and also a secure pseudorandom function, the proposed system is IND − CDBA A − secure.
The main security concern of our system is that the attacker might obtain access to the wallet management database and learn some sensitive information. To formalize the security demand against such an attacker, we introduce the definition of the wallet management database and IND-CDBA security definition. Our system can achieve IND-CDBA security since each address and private key record is encrypted with the WS16 HIKE scheme, which has been proven to be IND-KE-CCA secure under the SXDH assumption. By standard arguments, it is shown that IND-CPA security implies IND-CDBA security. Thus, the wallet management database that we built is IND-CDBA secure, while the underlying HIKE scheme can provide a much stronger security guarantee than standard IND-CPA security. As such, the attacker cannot extract any information from our wallet management database.
A. EVALUATION BASED ON KEY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
In this section, we analyze the usability and security using a evaluation framework proposed by Eskandari et al. [10] . This evaluation framework is used to evaluate the security and usability of bitcoin key management approaches. The security evaluation considers the attacks that occur in practice such as malware, physical theft, and password loss. In addition, the usability evaluation focuses on novice users. The evaluation defines 14 core tasks involving cryptocurrency key management, including client launch time, transaction execution time, cross-device capabilities, and main wallet recovery. The evaluation of our scheme is shown in Table 1 ; we compare our scheme with Bitcoin core [19] , MultiBit [12] , Bitaddress [20] , Bitcoin Blockchain.info and Brainwallet [21] . These chosen schemes represent approaches based on local storage methods, password-protected schemes, offline storage password-derived key methods, and hosted wallets, respectively. A black dot means that the system can satisfy this property. The black circle means that the system can partially satisfy the corresponding property. Empty means that the system cannot satisfy this property. In the security category, our system achieves almost all the security goals. First, the chosen encryption is identity-based key-insulated encryption, with which the proxy's decryption key is available in a fixed number of periods; beyond this number of periods, the proxy loses the ability to obtain the wallet information. Therefore, although we cannot guarantee that the run environment of the proxy is trusted, we can mitigate losses in that, even when malware can obtain a decryption key, it can only obtain a part of a wallet and not all of it. Second, our system does not suffer from offline issues; the full sensitive massage is encoded before it is delivered. Therefore, according to the evaluation standard for the key being kept offline, we can say that our scheme can partially achieve these goals. The master device is bound to a user in protocol 1, and it should authenticate the user's identity by his/her bio information, as described in protocol 4. The account text and proxy authorization are automatically executed by the master device and proxy program, which avoid physical observation attacks. By executing protocol 6, our scheme can recovery the master device secret key, which can be used to regenerate the wallet key with protocols 2 and 3. Therefore, we claim that our scheme is resilient to password loss.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the main algorithm in terms of running time. The underlying cryptographic schemes are quite efficient and take little time, except the identity-based key-insulated scheme. Hence, in this section, we will show that using such security-enhanced and fullfunction wallet requires minimal additional overhead and that the time delay is only a couple of milliseconds, making it sufficient efficient for real-world deployment. We implement our identity-based key-insulated scheme with the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography (JPBC) library to evaluate the time complexity of the required cryptographic operations. To generate the prime-order bilinear groups, we use the Type A elliptic curve, which is expressed as y 2 = x 3 + x. All the primes chosen in our experiment are 512 bits and generated randomly by the system. The experiment was executed on a computer with a 3.3 GHz Intel Pentium G3260 CPU, 4 GB of RAM and a 64-bit Ubuntu 15.04 operating system.
Using the JPBC Library in the aforementioned PC environment, the time required to perform a multiplication in a bilinear group G 1 is approximately 0.06 ms, and in G 2 , it is approximately 0.01 ms. The time to perform an exponentiation in a bilinear group G 1 is approximately 11.5 ms, and in G 2 , it is approximately 11.3 ms. The time to compute a pairing in a bilinear group is approximately 12.0 ms. Table 7 shows the average time cost for 50 tests with ∈ [1, 5] . Our IKE scheme in our system only requires 2 levels, where = 1. Thus, each partial time is less than 25 ms. The introduced cryptographic algorithm has almost no influence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the rapid increase in the value of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin), there is an urgent need for a tool that can provide a means of using cryptocurrencies securely and efficiently. The main challenge is the gap between the limited memory of human beings and the complex key structures of cryptocurrencies.
We propose an effective, usable and secure cryptocurrency wallet management system based on a semi-trusteed social network, herein implementing a HIKE scheme, a secretsharing scheme, a signature scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme as building blocks. We present five protocols under our system, which imply that the system enjoys the properties of security-enhanced storage, portable login on different devices, no-password authentication, flexible key delegation, blind wallet recovery, etc. In addition, we take IND-CDBA security as the security definition for the systems. Finally, we show that if the underlying HIKE scheme is IND-CPA-secure, our system is IND-CDBA-secure.
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